The situation on the evening of 13 September Ukraine time seems to have been as follows. The first map is a western sources map of the front. Red occupied by Russia, grey recovered by Ukraine
This second is a google map on which I have obtained driving directions from Kharkiv to Enerhodar, the town at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. 400km, so you have scale… and a sense of the task for Ukraine in hurrying the Kharkiv forces with armour and heavy weapons, to a next probable offensive.
At the southern end of that route, around the eastern end of the lake, is the sole route kept open by the two sides for citizens… and used by the IAEA team visiting the ZNPP.
The Ukraine rapid recent advance in the grey area east of Kharkiv has led to a consolidated front line now along the (shallow, fairly dry) Oskil river running north from near Izyum. Izyum was hitherto a substantial Russian base, lost. There is now a notionally stable front line with reinforcements of regular and heavily equipped Russian troops facing Ukraine forces. While it may be the case, as claimed, that the Russians had enough warning to encourage some civilians to withdraw east and north into Russia, there was a gross failure, strategic, tactical, psychological on the part of the Russian command leaving Luhansk territorial forces with poverty of tactical intelligence, antitank weapons and mines.
There is now rapid movement of Ukraine main forces from that front southward to a new front and potential offensive in the area west of Donetsk and south of the city of Zaporizhzhia (well back from the front, in Ukraine held territory, unlike the part of the Zaporizhzhia region in which the ZNPP is located). To slow this movement the Russians cut power supply to the railway network and more, across Ukraine, necessitating movement on local roads. Pro-Russian commentators say that half the Ukrainian uniform wearing forces in the Kharkiv offensive were from NATO countries, together with NATO weapons. They say that from this point the Russians will attack more widely, as with US forces destroying Iraq power systems in 24 hours.
The new front area is long. Ukraine might strike towards Donetsk, or towards Mariupol on the Azov sea coast, or towards Enerhodar. With the main objective likely to be splitting the Russian occupation. There are strategic rail lines that cross at Chernihivka (black circle)
The empty space north of that rail centre might not be seriously defended. For Ukraine forces to take that centre they would need a lot of fuel, not just sufficient to get there but also if necessary to retreat without loss of major new weapon systems. Ukraine will know that the Russians may let them try to cross open country (see next map) to get to the rail line at Chernihivka. They know they will face Russian strength if they get there.
Just to the east of this, Russian forces are continuing the arduous business of grinding forward slowly in Donetsk region. They have much invested in holding their ground.
With continuing rocket attacks near the ZNPP from Ukraine forces the power plant has been shut down. A small number of IAEA people remain there.
At the Kherson front there seem to be some scouting ventures, but problems on the Ukraine side from the previous disastrous adventure sending inexperienced troops across open flat country, facing heavy defensive weapons. Morale must be rotten with thousands dead and survivors donating blood for their comrades. For the Russians there is a major problem in Kherson with the bridges behind them, over the Dnieper River, destroyed by Ukraine. Part of the new Third Corps of the Russian army has been brought in this direction through Crimea. Kherson is an ancient town of the Cossacks who from this region in 1300 or so refused to submit to serfdom under the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth. Eventually taking Kyiv. Tiny origins of a Ukraine state, far in the future, under the USSR. Wandering borders…
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